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It seemed so clear a half-century ago. After years of frustration reviewing the
voluntariness of confessions on a case-by-case basis,1 a Supreme Court majority


© Paul Marcus, 2020. A version of this paper was presented in October 2019 at The Catholic
University of America, Columbus School of Law.
+
Haynes Professor Law, College of William and Mary. With thanks to Jeff Bellin, Adam
Gershowitz and Tommy Miller for helpful suggestions on how to improve the Supreme Court’s
application of Miranda in this context.
1. This line of cases was decided under the Due Process Clause. In each of its many cases
in the 1950s and 1960s, the Court felt obliged to review the record in its entirety to determine
whether the police engaged in coercive behavior. The leading case remains Spano v. New York,
360 U.S. 315 (1959). There, in finding the confession involuntary, the Court relied upon more than
a dozen factors. They included, among others, that the defendant:
 was foreign born
 had no prior experience in the criminal justice system
 was a high school dropout
 was emotionally unstable
 was questioned for eight hours
 did not give a narrative statement
 was pressured into speaking by a friend of his who was directed by the police
Id. at 321–23. The record number of relied-upon factors I and my research team could find is 17
(yes, 17!) in United States v. Jacques, 744 F.3d 804 (1st Cir. 2014). See generally, Paul Marcus,
It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal
Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U.L. REV. 601, 640–42 (2006) (discussing the factors considered in finding
a confession to be involuntary as a matter of law).
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in Miranda v. Arizona held that incriminating statements resulting from
interrogation while in custody would not be admissible at trial to prove guilt
unless warnings were given to advise a suspect of rights of silence and an
attorney.2 It is disappointing to report that if anything has been established over
the past 50 years, it is that this mandate isn’t clear at all. It turns out that police
officers do not necessarily give exactly the warnings suggested by Chief Justice
Warren back then.3 Although a person formally under arrest is no doubt in
custody, many other individuals questioned by uniformed and armed law
enforcement officers may not be viewed as being in custody.4
This article looks at the confusion created by the direction that restrictions
imposed by the Supreme Court apply only when a suspect in custody is being
interrogated. The notion of interrogation has become muddled and has been
applied inconsistently. This short piece is not aimed at the broad policy concerns
regarding Miranda,5 nor whether the definition found in the case itself, as written
2. 384 U.S. 436, 440 (1966). Statements taken in violation of Miranda can be used to
impeach the in-court testimony of the suspect if she takes the stand and denies the commission of
the charged offense. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
3. The Supreme Court on several occasions has allowed warnings which appeared to offer
somewhat less information than that which appear to be required under Miranda. See:
 Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 53–54 (2010)—officers told suspect of “the right to talk to
a lawyer before answering any of [the officers’] questions,” and that the defendant would
“have the right to use any of these rights at any time [he] want[ed] during [the]
interview.”
 Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 197 (1989)—”Before confessing, respondent was given
warnings by the police, which included the advice that a lawyer would be appointed ‘if
and when you go to court.’”
 California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 358–59 (1981)—
[R]espondent was indisputably informed that he had “the right to talk to a lawyer before
you are questioned, have him present with you while you are being questioned, and all
during the questioning,” and further informed that he had “the right to have a lawyer
appointed to represent you at no cost to yourself,” . . . [but] was not explicitly informed
of his right to have an attorney appointed before further questioning.
Id. In each case there was a sharp dissent questioning whether the warnings given satisfied the
Fifth Amendment mandate.
4. There has been a tremendous amount of litigation concerning non-arrest custody
questions. The fact patterns here are limited only by one’s imagination, as the custody
determination may relate to questioning in a variety of locations. See Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S.
499 (in a prison setting); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (in a police station where the
suspect was invited to come in order to speak with officers); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)
(in the suspect’s home); United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2002) (in the suspect’s office
or business); Lineberger v. Conway, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104430 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (on the street
where the suspect is stopped by an officer); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 204 A.3d 1003 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2019) (in a police station where the suspect was invited to come in order to speak with officers);
Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370 (Pa. 2015) (in connection with a parole or probation
interview). For a recent discussion, see Paul Marcus, The Miranda Custody Requirement and
Juveniles, 85 TENN. L. REV. 251 (2017).
5. There is a rich body of excellent scholarship analyzing Miranda. For a small sampling of
recent scholarly work, see Paul Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review
of Fifty Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 97 B.U.L.
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back in 1967, is misleading. Rather, the key consideration here goes to how the
concept of interrogation is working on the ground; that is, are law enforcement
officers and courts using this term in any sort of uniform and understandable
fashion?6
I. THE BEGINNING
Let us start with the principal discussion of interrogation by the Supreme
Court in Rhode Island v. Innis.7 There, the Court found that interrogation meant
words or actions by an officer that were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. Innis left no doubt that the police initiative does not
have to be in the form of questions as such; actions likely to elicit a response
could constitute interrogation. As explained seven years after Innis: ”[T]he
goals of the Miranda safeguards could be effectuated if those safeguards
extended not only to express questioning, but also to ‘its functional
equivalent.’”8
Trying to figure out the “functional equivalent” of interrogation has turned
out to be no easy task. Does one consider the officer’s state of mind in engaging
the suspect? Or, rather, do we look at what the suspect believed was
happening? Or is it an entirely objective standard? All of the above, it appears,
as we are trying to determine whether “words or actions on the part of police
[were such] that the police should know [they were] reasonably likely to elicit
an incriminating response.”9 The Innis Court wrote that judges must especially
evaluate whether the police had “knowledge . . . concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion. . . .”10 This
awkward standard has led to the federal and state cases being all over the map
regarding the proper application of the term interrogation.
To be sure, the Court itself in Innis had difficulty deciding if the actions and
words of the police officers constituted interrogation. Let us reflect on what
took place in that case. Innis was arrested and charged with murder. As he was
being driven to the police station, two officers in the car began talking to each
REV. 685 (2017); Roscoe C. Howard Jr. & Lisa A. Rich, A History of Miranda and Why It Remains
Vital Today, 40 VAL. L. REV. 685 (2006); Yale Kamisar, The Miranda Case Fifty Years Later, 97
B.U.L. REV. 1293 (2017); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L.
REV. 965 (2012); Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2015); George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Spider Web, 97
B.U.L. REV. 1215 (2017); Tracey Maclin, A Comprehensive Analysis of the History of
Interrogation Law, with Some Shots Directed at Miranda v. Arizona, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1387 (2015)
(book review).
6. Reviewing the reported state and federal decisions which define and apply the term
interrogation was a massive undertaking. To complete this article, it was necessary to read well
over one thousand decisions handed down in just the last 10–15 years.
7. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
8. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 526 (1987).
9. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.
10. Id. at 302, n.8.
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other about a missing murder weapon and the harm that could befall little
children.
While in route to the central station, Patrolman Gleckman initiated a
conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the missing
shotgun. As Patrolman Gleckman later testified:
“A. At this point, I was talking back and forth with
Patrolman McKenna stating that I frequent this area while
on patrol and [that because a school for handicapped
children is located nearby,] there’s a lot of handicapped
children running around in this area, and God forbid one of
them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt
themselves.”
Patrolman McKenna apparently shared his fellow officer’s concern:
“A. I more or less concurred with him [Gleckman] that it
was a safety factor and that we should, you know, continue
to search for the weapon and try to find it.”
While Patrolman Williams said nothing, he overheard the
conversation between the two officers:
“A. He [Gleckman] said it would be too bad if the little—I
believe he said a girl—would pick up the gun, maybe kill
herself.”
[Innis] then interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers
should turn the car around so he could show them where the gun was
located.11
The defense argued strenuously that this conversation amounted to
interrogation in violation of Miranda. The contention was that the officers’
back-and-forth conversation was intended to result in an incriminating statement
and it should have been no surprise to the officers when the conversation did just
that. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, agreed and found this
exchange to be interrogation:
The Court attempts to characterize Gleckman’s statements as “no
more than a few offhand remarks” which could not reasonably have
been expected to elicit a response. If the statements had been
addressed to respondent, it would be impossible to draw such a
conclusion. The simple message of the “talking back and forth”
between Gleckman and McKenna was that they had to find the
shotgun to avert a child’s death.
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a
suspect—any suspect—than the assertion that if the weapon is not
found an innocent person will be hurt or killed. And not just any
innocent person, but an innocent child—a little girl—a helpless,
11. Id. at 294–95 (citations omitted).
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handicapped little girl on her way to school. The notion that such an
appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect
were known to have some special interest in handicapped children
verges on the ludicrous. As a matter of fact, the appeal to a suspect to
confess for the sake of others, to “display some evidence of decency
and honor,” is a classic interrogation technique.12
The majority of the Court took a very different view:
Moreover, it cannot be fairly concluded that the respondent was
subjected to the “functional equivalent” of questioning. It cannot be
said, in short, that Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have
known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the respondent. There is nothing in the
record to suggest that the officers were aware that the respondent was
peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the
safety of handicapped children. Nor is there anything in the record to
suggest that the police knew that the respondent was unusually
disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest.
The case thus boils down to whether, in the context of a brief
conversation, the officers should have known that the respondent
would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response.
Given the fact that the entire conversation appears to have consisted
of no more than a few offhand remarks, we cannot say that the officers
should have known that it was reasonably likely that Innis would so
respond.13
12. Id. at 306 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
13. Id. at 302–03. There are many cases, following Innis, which do not find interrogation so
long as the comments of one officer are directed to another officer. Two state decisions make the
point. In Snow v. State, 800 So. 2d 472, 499 (Miss. 2001), two police officers were standing outside
of an interrogation room roughly two feet away from the defendant who was suspected of murder.
One police officer asked the other whether the defendant’s clothes had been found yet. Id. at 498–
99. The defendant heard this and informed the officers that he could tell them the location of his
clothes. Id. at 499. Held, no interrogation—the officer’s comments were not the functional
equivalent of interrogation as “they were not directed toward [the defendant] . . . .” Id. at 500. In
another case, Smith v. State, 995 A.2d 685 (Md. 2010), an officer found narcotics while conducting
a search. He announced loudly that he was going to arrest everyone in the apartment. Id. at 688.
The defendant was in the apartment and heard this. Id. He contended that this statement was meant
to elicit an incriminating statement. Id. at 690. The court held that there was no interrogation
because the officer testified that his comment was directed to other officers in the room rather than
to the defendant. Id. at 691. The court explained, “[t]he corporal’s actions did not demonstrate
conduct calculated to elicit an incriminating statement.” Id. 690–91. The federal courts travel a
similar path, as seen in United States v. Gordon, No. 1:14-cr-312-WSD, 2015 WL 4164757 (N.D.
Ga. July 9, 2015). There the defendant overheard a conversation between the two investigating
officers talking about deploying a dog to sniff outside of the defendant’s apartment. Id. at *1. After
hearing of the officers’ plan, the defendant made incriminating remarks. Id. He asserted that the
police action was in violation of Innis. Id. at *3. The court disagreed.
Defendant simply overheard a discussion between two officers about an investigative
step that they intended to pursue through the use of a drug dog. The discussion was not
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How complicated. Even the Justices couldn’t agree on whether the Patrolmen
had interrogated Innis.
Is Innis an unusual case? Maybe.
Is it an oddly fact-specific
holding? Perhaps. Still, it is the key decision followed throughout the nation. It
is a ruling that has led to a very serious problem in application. To put the matter
directly, there is no consistent application of the Innis standard, whether in state
or federal courts. To support that conclusion, one must examine the four major
categories of reported decisions on point with judges attempting to decide
whether police actions or words fall within the prescribed behavior:
1. Direct questioning not seen as interrogation
2. Direct questioning deemed to be interrogation
3. Statements or actions—but not questions—not found to be
interrogation
4. Statements or actions—but not questions—held to be interrogation
II.
A.

THE APPLICATION

Direct questioning not seen as interrogation

1. The booking exception
No astute criminal justice observer would contend that any routine sort of
question directed to an individual constitutes interrogation. It could hardly be
the law that when asking the suspect if she wished decaffeinated coffee an
incriminating response would be excluded at trial (“decaffeinated, oh yes—not
the high octane stuff since Wednesday when I robbed the store, no more caffeine
for me . . .”). Indeed, very damaging statements during the booking process are
normally admitted, as explained by the Ninth Circuit: “[T]he ‘routine gathering
of background biographical information, such as identity, age, and address,
usually does not constitute interrogation.’ What is called the ‘booking
exception,’ then, is in fact an ‘exemp[tion] from Miranda’s coverage’ for
questions posed ‘to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking
or pretrial services.’”14 It is an exemption because such questions “do not, by
directed at Defendant. Having overheard the plan to use the drug dog, Defendant chose
voluntarily to offer the information about his marijuana use and that there was marijuana
in the apartment.
Id. Of course, in Innis the Supreme Court actually held that the officer’s design was not the key
factor. It was to be an objective standard. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301. For a thoughtful treatment of
these and other issues involved with Innis, see Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, The Two Mirandas,
43 N. KY. L. REV. 317, 345–47 (2016).
14. United States v. Zapien, 861 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 842 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2016)) (citation omitted). The judges, however, cautioned
against too broad an application of this exception.
Nonetheless, we have “recognize[d] the potential for abuse by law enforcement officers
who might, under the guise of seeking ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ information, deliberately
elicit an incriminating statement from a suspect.” To account for this risk, we apply an
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their very nature, involve the psychological intimidation that Miranda is
designed to prevent.”15
The Supreme Court first applied the doctrine thirty years ago.
The Commonwealth argues that the seven questions asked by Officer
Hosterman just prior to the sixth birthday question—regarding
Muniz’s name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and
current age—did not constitute custodial interrogation as we have
defined the term in Miranda and subsequent cases. In Miranda, the
Court referred to “interrogation” as actual “questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers.” . . . Thus, custodial interrogation for
purposes of Miranda includes both express questioning, and also
words or actions that, given the officer’s knowledge of any special
susceptibilities of the suspect, the officer knows or reasonably should
know are likely to “have . . . the force of a question on the accused,”
and therefore be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
We disagree with the Commonwealth’s contention that Officer
Hosterman’s first seven questions regarding Muniz’s name, address,
height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age do not qualify
as custodial interrogation as we defined the term in Innis, merely
because the questions were not intended to elicit information for
investigatory purposes. As explained above, the Innis test focuses
primarily upon “the perspective of the suspect.” . . . Muniz’s answers
to these first seven questions are nonetheless admissible because the
questions fall within a “routine booking question” exception which
exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the
“biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial
services.” . . . [T]he first seven questions were “requested for record“objective” test to determine whether the questioning constituted interrogation.
Seemingly routine biographical questions can constitute interrogation if, in light of all
the circumstances, the officers should have known that their words or actions were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. In making this determination, “the
focus is upon the defendant’s perceptions.”
Id. (citations omitted). For a good overview of the various approaches to the booking exception,
see Julie A. Simeone, Note, Not So Legitimate: Why Courts Should Reject an Administrative
Approach to the Routine Booking Exception, 89 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1454, 1461 (2014) (“The language
in Innis and Muniz generates a complex, if not utterly inconsistent, standard for what constitutes
routing booking questions.”). The author there indicates that most courts use one of three
approaches with the analysis: subjective, objective or administrative function. Id. at 1461, 1484.
These recent cases reference such approaches: United States v. Arellano-Banuelos, 912 F.3d 862,
866 (5th Cir. 2019); Rivera v. Thompson, 879 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 2018); People v. Villa-Gomez,
215 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161, 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); Toler v. United States, 198 A.3d 767, 770 (D.C.
2018); Tobiassen v. State, 213 So. 3d 1045, 1049 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Hughes v. State, No.
123, 2018 Md. App. LEXIS 1152, at *30 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 19, 2018); State v. Boyd, 380
P.3d 941, 949 (Or. 2016).
15. United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Booth,
669 F.2d 1231, 1237 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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keeping purposes only,” and therefore the questions appear reasonably
related to the police’s administrative concerns. In this context,
therefore, the first seven questions asked at the booking center fall
outside the protections of Miranda and the answers thereto need not
be suppressed.16
The booking process exception seems straightforward enough. Run-of-themill questions in the booking process attempting to garner the most basic
information surely cannot be found to be disfavored interrogation. “Booking
process,” alas, is hardly a precise term of art. As noted by the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas, “booking exception cases around the country are confusing
and conflicting.”17 Consider, for instance, these two cases involving the
interrogation issue arising during booking. The Texas case mentioned here had
defendant arrested for evading arrest.18 As personal belongings were being
taken from his car—but before Miranda warnings were given—the arresting
officer “took the thumb drive that was located in the back seat and held it up and
. . . asked [the defendant] what it was.”19 The defendant “responded, ‘It’s a
memory drive.’”20 The officer followed up by asking to whom the thumb drive
belonged. The defendant told the officer that it belonged to the defendant.
These two statements were to be used against the defendant in building the
state’s case. The defendant moved to suppress claiming that he:
 was in custody at the time of the exchange
 was not given warnings
 was asked a series of questions
 gave incriminating answers to those questions
Thus, he contended, the statements could not be admitted in evidence, being in
violation of both Miranda and Innis.21 The Texas judges rejected this contention

16. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600–02 (1990) (citations omitted). While the most
common exception under the interrogation doctrine, booking is not the only one. Also noteworthy
is the so-called public safety exception announced initially in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,
655 (1984). If the purpose of the interrogation of the suspect in custody relates to the safety of the
public or the officers, Miranda does not apply. Id. For discussions of this exception, see Bruce
Ching, Mirandizing Terrorism Suspects? The Public Safety Exception, the Rescue Doctrine, and
Implicit Analogies to Self-Defense, Defense of Others, and Battered Woman Syndrome, 64 CATH.
U.L. REV. 613 (2015); Rorie A. Norton, Note, Matters of Public Safety and the Current Quarrel
over the Scope of the Quarles Exception to Miranda, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931 (2010); Joanna
Wright, Note, Mirandizing Terrorists? An Empirical Analysis of the Public Safety Exception, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (2011).
17. Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). For a good overview, see
Elizabeth Parrish, Comment, In Need of Clarification: A Call to Define the Scope of the Routine
Booking Exception by Adopting the Legitimate Administrative Function Test, 62 CATH. U.L. REV.
1087 (2013).
18. Alford, 358 S.W.3d at 650.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 651, 653.
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and, taking an objective view of the circumstances, found the routine booking
exception present.
A range of governmental interests supports an inventory process. It is
not unheard of for persons employed in police activities to steal
property taken from arrested persons; similarly, arrested persons have
been known to make false claims regarding what was taken from their
possession at the station house. A standardized procedure for making
a list or inventory as soon as reasonable after reaching the station
house not only deters false claims but also inhibits theft or careless
handling of articles taken from the arrested person
In this case, the record undisputedly shows that, as appellant was
being booked into the jail, Officer Ramirez asked appellant if the noncontraband item discovered in the patrol car belonged to him. Upon
confirming that it did, Officer Ramirez gave the item to facility
personnel, who placed it with appellant’s personal property for
safekeeping. Based on our de novo review of the record, we find that
the totality of the circumstances objectively show that Officer
Ramirez’s questions were reasonably related to a legitimate
administrative concern.22
Do you accept this argument, or are you skeptical? Asking about ownership
of personal property with an arrest for illegal drugs? Were those questions
“reasonably related to a legitimate administrative interest?” It is hard to
understand that position, especially when contrasted with many other decisions
in this area relating to drug prosecutions. Here is one, coming from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.23 In it, the defendant was asked—
before receiving warnings—”where he was from, how he had arrived at the
house, and when he had arrived.”24 He made an incriminating statement in
response. Using the broad view of the routine booking exception as applied in
the Texas case, one could easily find these questions to be “reasonably related
to a legitimate administrative interest.” Perhaps the officers were just trying to
figure out the particulars about the individual, where he resided, etc. If so, there
would be no improper interrogation, no Miranda violation.25 This court,
however, took a very different view:
[A]sking questions about when and how Lopez arrived at a household
ostensibly linked to a drug sale, as well as his origin, are relevant to
an investigation and cannot be described as related only to securing
the house or identifying the defendant. Furthermore, the officers
immediately ascertained that Lopez did not speak English and learned
shortly thereafter that he was from Mexico, factors making him
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 661 n.28, 662.
United States v. Pacheco-Lopez, 531 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 424.
Id.
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“particularly susceptible” to questioning before Miranda warnings.
These facts implicate Miranda’s concern about the danger of coercion
resulting from “the interaction of custody and official interrogation.”
The location, the nature of the questioning and the failure to take
notes or document the defendant’s identity also support our conclusion
that the booking exception is not applicable in this case.26
These two cases are offered as illustrations to show how genuinely difficult it
may be to determine if Miranda warnings are needed in connection with those
presumably run-of-the-mill questions asked upon arrest or at the police
station. Still, it is fair to note that most such questions are deemed to fall within
the exception as construed by both federal and state judges. There are many
such cases. Here are a few examples:
 Upon his arrest, officers asked the suspect for his name, where he was
from, his address, and similar information.27 Improbably, the suspect then
made an incriminating statement. Held, the exception applied, as the
officers “had no indication whatsoever that asking Grant about his living
arrangements or where he was from might elicit an incriminating
response.”28
 After the defendant was arrested, the officer asked a series of standard
questions such as date of birth, weight, height, and job.29 The defendant
responded that he was “a drug dealer” when asked about his job.30 The
officer’s questions were appropriate interrogation, as the questions were
central to booking.31
 During the booking procedure, the officer asked defendant if he had any
nicknames and the defendant answered “Slim.”32 The officer had been
told that this “was the nickname by which the victims knew the former
coworker whom they accused of robbing them.”33 Not unacceptable
interrogation, even if the officer knew that the defendant’s nickname was
26. Id. at 424–25 (citation omitted).
27. State v. Grant, 876 N.W.2d 639, 650 (Neb. 2016).
28. Id. at 655–56.
29. United States v. Sanchez, 817 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2016).
30. Id.
31. Id. The case was an easy one for the judges:
And when Toledo asked him whether he was employed, Sanchez matter-of-factly
answered that he was “a drug dealer.” By the way, Toledo played no part in the Sanchez
investigation—other than knowing the booking charges, Toledo knew nothing about the
case against Sanchez. Also, Toledo had no info suggesting that his asking these standard
booking questions might cause Sanchez to incriminate himself. What is more, Toledo
did not ask the questions to further the investigation. And he did not ask Sanchez any
follow-up questions tied to the “drug dealer” comment—a comment Toledo shared with
Templeman after booking.
Id.
32. People v. Alleyne, 828 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
33. Id.
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relevant to the question of identity. The court found that “the officer was
simply asking the questions set forth on the booking sheet, and that none
of his questions was ‘designed to elicit incriminatory admissions’ or ‘a
disguised attempt at investigatory interrogation[.]’”34
 During booking, the officer asked the defendant what his real hair color
was.35 The defendant responded, “[b]rown,” and said that he had just
dyed it one day earlier.36 This statement helped to convict the defendant
of robbery, and there was no 5th Amendment problem. The police in this
case did not violate Innis because the actual hair color was reasonably
related to administrative concerns and the question was neither intended
nor likely to elicit an incriminating response.37
 After arresting the defendant, the officer asked if the defendant was on
probation, how much time the defendant had over his head, and if he was
working.38 The defendant later made an incriminating comment. This
fell within the booking exception, as the defendant knew the justice
system and was calm.39
These several cases may seem to involve questions that are innocuous, but
that may be deceptive. In each case an incriminating statement was made in
immediate response to the question. And, the many, many cases exploring the
routine booking exception demonstrate just how uncertain and inconsistent the
rulings are in this area.40
34. Id. (citation omitted).
35. Rosa v. McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 213 (2d Cir. 2005).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 221–22. The court explained:
Proper completion of the booking form in this case required the officer to complete the
relevant portions of the form by filling in the correct information pertaining to the various
elements that comprise the basic personal physical characteristics, including hair color.
Moreover, if the officer perceives—either through direct observation or otherwise—that
a specific piece of information provided by the arrestee is patently incorrect, then it is not
only reasonable, but arguably the officer’s duty, to inquire further.
Id.
38. United States v. Davis, 773 F.3d 334, 337 (1st Cir. 2014).
39. Id. at 339. The court found that “nothing in the record suggests a reasonable officer under
these circumstances would have understood that general questions directed at Defendant’s status
prior to his arrest would elicit Defendant’s comment regarding his anger towards Hicks for failing
to remove the rifles from the home.” Id.
40. One can readily find a rather remarkably large number of just such decisions. For a good
overview of the judicial applications of the doctrine in recent times (in addition to the cases cited
in supra note 13), see Coronel v. Biter, No. EDCV 12-974 SVW (LAL), 2014 WL 10503883 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 19, 2014); United States v. Corey, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2012); People v.
Madriz, No. H044665, 2018 WL 5292079 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2018); Senser v. State, 243 So.3d
1003 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); Commonwealth v. Caswell, 123 N.E.3d 80 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019)
(unpublished table decision); State v. Perez, No. A16-0242, 2017 WL 958471 (Mn. Ct. App. May
30, 2017) (unpublished table decision); State v. Gillispie, 436 P.3d 65 (Or. Ct. App. 2019);
Martinez-Hernandez v. State, 468 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. App. 2015); Commonwealth. v. Malick, No.
1739-15-1, 2016 WL 1105078 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2016).
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2. Other direct questioning not seen as interrogation
Even if it does not take place during booking, is it possible that directly
questioning a suspect who is in custody does not constitute interrogation under
Innis? Not only is it possible, but it is extremely common. And, I am referring
here not to very mundane sorts of questions, but those truly related to the crime
for which the suspect will be charged. Not convinced? Here is a small sampling
of such decisions:
 The defendant was arrested, and an officer asked if the defendant was the
person against whom there was a personal protection order issued.41 Not
interrogation, as the officer was trying to determine the suspect’s identity
and the question concerned a “purely civil matter.”42
 The defendant was arrested and then stated, “I can help you out, I don’t
want to go back to jail, I’ve got information for you.”43 The officer
followed up by asking, “what do you mean?”44 Not interrogation, as the
“query would reasonably be expected to elicit information incriminating
someone else” and not the defendant.45
 During trial, the constable asked the defendant if his attorney wanted him
to wear a bulletproof vest.46 The inquiry could not have been reasonably
expected to elicit an inculpatory statement because “[the] inquiry was
simply a security-related question made in the ordinary course of the
administration of justice.”47
 Defendant was in a car accident.48 When the tow truck driver arrived, he
noticed a strong odor coming from the trunk of defendant’s car. The tow
truck driver saw defendant stuff marijuana from the trunk into her black
bag. The truck driver told the officer, and the officer asked the defendant

41. United States v. Evans, 581 F.3d 333, 337 (6th Cir. 2009).
42. Id. at 343.
43. United States v. Johnson, 734 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2013).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 277. The court continued:
Johnson argues that, his professed motivations notwithstanding, Detective Mackensen
should have known that to ask “what do you mean?” could at least possibly have elicited
an incriminating response. But this sets the bar too low. It is possible, of course, that a
suspect in custody could implicate himself in a criminal act in response to any question
or action no matter how innocuous. If possibility were the standard, therefore, an officer
would risk suppression whenever he spoke within earshot of an unwarned suspect. But
Miranda was intended to protect suspects from coercive police practices, not render
officers mute.
Id.
46. Laird v. Horn, 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 94 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
47. Id. at 95.
48. United States v. Zuber, 485 Fed. App’x 921, 922 (10th Cir. 2012).
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about the smell. The defendant made an incriminating statement. Not
interrogation, as the statement was made voluntarily.49
FBI agents were at the defendant’s hotel to execute an arrest warrant, but
the defendant had booked his room under a different name.50 The FBI
agents saw the defendant and asked about his identification, the name he
was registered under, and the room he was actually in. Not violative of
Innis, as these questions were the sort “normally attendant to arrest and
custody.”51
An officer pulled over the defendant for speeding.52 The officer called for
backup to arrest the defendant, patted down the defendant, and felt a lump
in the defendant’s pocket. The officer then asked the defendant, “What is
in your pocket?”53 This was not an interrogation, as the officer’s question
was merely an inquiry normally attendant to arrest and custody.54
The defendant was “generally asked: 1) how he was doing, 2) basic
identifying information, such as his name, age and address, 3) how long
he had been on the base, 4) his educational background and, 5) the
languages he spoke.”55 He then made an incriminating statement.56 The
court found no interrogation.57
A personal favorite is a widely discussed case in which a detective walked
by the arrested defendant in the police station and asked, “What’s up

49. Id. at 923. The officer “did not ask her about ownership or possession of the bag . . . her
statement was spontaneous and unsolicited . . . and Miranda allows the admission of volunteered
statements not made in response to police questioning.” Id.
50. United States v. Durst, 138 F. Supp. 3d 741, 745 (E.D. La. 2015).
51. Id. at 753. These “generic questions for identification purposes are not calculated to elicit
incriminating responses and therefore do not trigger Miranda.” Id.
52. United States v. Woods, 711 F.3d 737, 739 (6th Cir. 2013).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 741. “‘What is in your pocket’ was not investigatory or otherwise calculated to
elicit an incriminating response, but rather a natural and automatic response to the unfolding events
during the normal course of an arrest.” Id.
55. United States v. Hitselberger, 991 F. Supp. 2d 130, 138 (D.D.C. 2014).
56. Id. at 137.
57. Id. at 138.
It is further clear that the conversation between the agents and Mr. Hitselberger was
conversational, and that Mr. Hitselberger was overly forthcoming with information,
especially regarding his relationship with his co-workers and his educational background
. . . [T]here was no “interrogation” during the 35 minute pre–Miranda interview because:
1) the agents asked only standard questions which were unlikely to elicit incriminating
responses, and 2) the agents had no additional knowledge that Mr. Hitselberger was
unusually susceptible to their standard questions.
Id.
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Maurice?”58 The defendant then made an incriminating statement. No
interrogation. The exchange was part of a casual conversation.59
These cases all involve quite direct questioning of the suspect, and they are
hardly—without doubt—benign sorts of inquiries as to the time of day or choices
for lunch. Yet, with such questions of the in-custody defendant, the courts had
little difficulty concluding there was no interrogation. Highly incriminating
responses were given in each of the cases, yet in none of these decisions is there
even an extended discussion of Innis and its reasonable police officer standard.
B. Direct questioning deemed to be interrogation
In this section we consider a number of cases with direct questioning, but they
involve the sorts of conversations which can hardly be viewed as purposely
attempting to squeeze out incriminating admissions. Still, the courts in these
cases find such questioning to be interrogation in stark contrast to those
decisions in the previous section. Once again, let us look at a small sample of
such decisions.
 During a routine patrol, officers saw a gun in the defendant’s vest.60 As
they chased the defendant, the gun fell out of his vest, which he discarded
in an unseen location. Once the defendant was captured, the officers
asked the defendant questions about his age, criminal history, and the vest.
The court found that the questions about the defendant’s criminal history
and the vest were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.61
58. Prioleau v. State, 984 A.2d 851, 854 (Md. 2009).
59. As the court pointed out, “it is very well settled that not every question constitutes
‘interrogation’ of a suspect who is in custody when the question is asked.” Id. at 857. “[T]he
phrase ‘what’s up?’ is generally understood to be a greeting . . . .” Id. at 860 (quoting Prioleau v.
State, 943 A.2d 696, 702–03 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
60. United States v. Phillips, 146 F. Supp. 3d 837, 840 (E.D. Mich. 2015), aff’d, 677 Fed.
App’x 294 (6th Cir. 2017).
61. Id. at 847–48. The court explained:
Here the Court finds the officers crossed the line by asking questions of an investigatory
nature as opposed to questions merely involving the processing of an arrest. Based on
the facts presently before the Court, questions about the Defendant’s criminal history and
the location of evidence mandated a Miranda warning because these questions were
“reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response[.]”
Questioning a defendant about the location of evidence constitutes interrogation under
Miranda.
Similarly, the Court finds questioning the defendant about his criminal history also
constitutes interrogation, because there is a distinction between asking about a
defendant’s personal history—which the Court would agree is a routine innocuous
booking question—and a defendant’s criminal history.
Looking at the facts here, the officers knew that the Defendant was at one point wearing
a vest and questioned him about the location of that evidence. Asking questions about
the location of the vest was relevant to the officer’s investigation, and cannot be described
as related to the booking process. This fact alone, implicates Miranda’s concern about
the danger of coercion resulting from “the interaction of custody and official
interrogation.”
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The officers patted down the defendant and then asked him what the lump
in his pants was.62 The court held that this constituted interrogation in
light of the officer’s suspicion as to the criminal nature of the lump.63
After arresting the defendant, one officer asked him: “Do you know why
you are here?”64 Held to be interrogation, the officer should have known
it would likely “evoke a declaration from [the] defendant.”65
Officers handcuffed the defendant, placed him in a police car, and then
transported him to his residence, which the police were preparing to
search.66 One officer asked the defendant, in reference to an unusual car
in front of his house, who owned the car. This was interrogation, as the
officer asked the question to confirm a suspicion about illegal behavior.67
The defendant invoked his right to remain silent as an officer read him his
Miranda rights.68 The officer finished reading the warnings and then
immediately asked, “Do you even know why you’re under arrest?”69 The
court held that the officer’s question reasonably required the defendant to
discuss his substantive offense and so was interrogation.70
The defendant was arrested after being seen smoking a blunt (a cigar that
has been opened, emptied of tobacco, and then filled with marijuana).71
The defendant then mentioned he had a gun on him and that he had found
it after cleaning out his dead grandmother’s house. During the
interrogation, the officer asked when the defendant’s grandmother passed

Id.
62. United States v. Milikan, 404 F. Supp. 2d 924, 929–30 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
63. Id. at 930. As the court explained, “Lt. Lowrie specifically asked Milikan what the lump
was and how much it was. The court [found that] these were questions intended to elicit an
incriminating response.” Id.
64. People v. Thomas, 27 N.Y.S.3d 815, 820 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 2016).
65. Id. at 820 (alteration in original) (quoting People v. Ackerman, 528 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217–
18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)).
Here, Investigator Hickey was involved in the investigation of the stabbing two days
prior, had spoken to the officers who had taken defendant into custody at 93 Prince Street,
and so was aware that the victim Reed had positively identified the defendant. While
“Do you know why you are here” is perhaps a question routinely posed to suspects being
interviewed by law enforcement, the Court finds that based on the specific facts presented
here, the defendant was entitled to be advised of his Miranda rights before being asked
that question and the pre-Miranda statements are suppressed.
Id. at 820–21.
66. United States v. Olivarria, 781 F. Supp. 2d 387, 395 (N.D. Miss. 2011).
67. Id. at 393.
68. United States v. Abdallah, 911 F.3d 201, 207 (4th Cir. 2018).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 214 (stating “[o]ne can expect that criminal defendants who are asked ‘Do you know
why you are under arrest?’ will respond with a variety of incriminating, speculative statements
about their substantive offenses”).
71. United States v. Coates, 457 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565–66 (W.D. Pa. 2006).

460

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.3:1

away, and the court found that “it should have appeared reasonably likely
[to the officer] that his question could elicit an inculpatory response[.]”72
 The defendant’s house was raided by the FBI in search of child
pornography.73 The agents asked for the defendant’s help with the
investigation, and the defendant agreed, ultimately incriminating himself.
His aid was found to be a result of the interrogation.74
In none of these cases is there an obvious, nefarious attempt to have the
defendant give damaging information against her will. Nevertheless, the courts
here recognized that such questions—even if not directly calling for an
incriminating answer—may raise just the kind of concerns which were central
to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Miranda and Innis.
C. Statements or actions—but not questions—not found to be interrogation
Police officers may offer items of evidence to a suspect in custody. They may
even make comments about the coming prosecution to that person. What is the
legal response if that offer, or that statement, elicits an incriminating comment
from the defendant? Does that necessarily demonstrate interrogation under
Innis? The problem is not easy to resolve, as can be shown in one recent state
decision from Michigan.75
There, the defendant was in custody when an officer spoke with him: “The
only thing that I can tell you is this, and I’m not asking you questions I’m just
telling you. I hope that the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold of it
and nobody else can get hurt by it, okay, all right.”76 Three judges decided it
was not interrogation: “The officer’s comment . . . was not a question because it
did not ask for an answer or invite a response. It was a mere expression of hope
and concern.”77 However, one judge wrote that it was interrogation: “[The
officer’s] comments were made in a police interrogation room and were
expressly directed to the defendant, who was the only other person present when
the statements were made.”78 The fifth judge found interrogation as she focused
on the suspect’s youth: “Because juveniles often lack the wherewithal to resist
police pressures, they thus become uniquely susceptible to police interrogation
efforts including subtly compulsive techniques, and should be expected to
72. Id. at 570. This was so “because the answer to such a question would make [the
defendant’s] stated reason for carrying the handgun more or less credible, depending on the content
of that answer.” Id.
73. United States v. Familetti, 878 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2017).
74. Id. at 59. “After invading [the defendant]’s apartment to serve a search warrant, the agents
informed him that they were looking for perpetrators of child pornography, and asked him for
information. They left no doubt that [the defendant] was suspected of criminal involvement, and
his response would more than likely confirm as much.” Id.
75. See People v. White, 828 N.W.2d 329 (Mich. 2013).
76. Id. at 331.
77. Id. at 335.
78. Id. at 345–46 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
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respond to those efforts.”79 So, which is it? Do we look at the officer’s intent?
Do we instead evaluate the suspect’s understanding? Or, do we apply some sort
of reasonable person standard? This is difficult to answer, as the Michigan
judges seemed to use all these approaches.
Quite a number of judges appear to concur with the majority Michigan judges
and conclude that statements or actions that appear to be digging for harmful
responses from the suspect do not constitute interrogation. These illustrative
decisions show this:
 Defendant said he wanted to speak to his attorney.80 The officers called
for a jailer, and while waiting, one officer said to the defendant, “We don’t
need to talk to you anyway, our case is made.”81 The defendant then
incriminated himself. No interrogation, as “[t]he officer’s statement and
surrounding circumstances in this case are no more (and arguably are less)
evocative than those in Innis . . . .”82
 The defendant was in jail when two officers asked to speak with him.83
The defendant stated that he would not answer questions about firearms
trafficking because he was a convicted felon. One officer “advised
defendant that ‘we’ve got good information on you.’”84 Not interrogation
because the statement had “no compulsive element suggesting a Fifth
Amendment violation” and it was unrelated to the specific subject the
defendant said he would not discuss.85
 An officer asked the defendant to join him in his office to “get some air.”86
Once they were in the office, the officer informed the defendant about the
seriousness of his crime and the effect it would have on his employment.
The court ruled that the officer did not interrogate the defendant because
the officer did not reference specific evidence or particular aspects of the
case.87
 The investigating officer played tapes to the defendant which implicated
the defendant in the crime.88 Playing the tapes did not constitute
interrogation because “[b]riefly reciting to a suspect in custody the basis
79. Id. at 353 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
80. State v. Atchison, 258 S.W.3d 914, 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 917.
83. United States v. Hurst, 228 F.3d 751, 758–59 (6th Cir. 2000).
84. Id. at 759.
85. Id. at 760. The court further stated, “[T]here is nothing in the nature of defendant’s
statement to suggest it was the product of coercion or compulsion.” Id.
86. United States v. Ardines, 293 F.R.D. 117, 121 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
87. Id. at 124–25. “The magistrate judge’s ruling, that [the officer’s] comment amounted to
a declaratory statement, is not clearly erroneous. [The officer] did not reference the evidence or
any specific aspects of the case. No functional equivalent of an interrogation occurred; nor did a
statement that would elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 125 (citations omitted).
88. United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 284 (7th Cir. 2011).
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for holding him, without more, cannot be the functional equivalent of
interrogation.”89
After searching the defendant’s car, an officer found a gun under the front
passenger seat.90 The officer pulled the defendant and the passenger out
of the car and asked who owned the gun. The defendant and the passenger
said they did not know anything and the officer said that both of them
would be charged. No interrogation, as the officer relayed a “factually
accurate statement about” the officer’s next step.91
The police searched the defendant’s home and found heroin packets.92 An
officer approached the defendant, showed him the seized items and said,
“We’ve got a problem here.”93 The officer’s statement did not constitute
interrogation because the statement was a “preliminary comment intended
to get [the defendant’s] attention . . . .”94
Officers executed a search warrant and found an illegal shotgun in the
defendant’s presence.95 One officer then showed the other officer the gun,
who measured it, also in the defendant’s presence. Examining and
measuring the gun in front of the defendant was not interrogation; neither
officer acknowledged the defendant and so did not interrogate him.96
After the defendant invoked his right to counsel, an officer said, “I don’t
mind laying my cards on the table. I asked him not to say anything but
listen to what I had to say. I told him that I had already talked to his
partner Rowe, and Rowe [had implicated him in the robbery].”97 The
officer had not interrogated the defendant because the officer said not to
respond and because the officer left immediately after speaking.98

89. Id. at 285 (quoting Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir. 1995)). See also this
broad statement in State v. Aguilar-Benitez:
Under Louisiana law, it is permissible for an officer, even after a suspect invokes his
right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination, to inform the suspect of the
evidence linking the suspect to the crime. Without more, the disclosure of evidence does
not rise to the functional equivalent of direct questioning . . . .
260 So. 3d 1247, 1259–60 (La. Ct. App. 2018).
90. United States v. Collins, 683 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 2012).
91. Id. at 703 (“‘[V]olunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment
and their admissibility is not affected’ by the holding in Miranda.”).
92. United States v. Genao, 281 F.3d 305, 307 (1st Cir. 2002).
93. Id. at 308.
94. Id. at 311. As the court explained, “the remark was brief, was not worded in a particularly
confrontational manner, and did not directly accuse Genao of any crime or seek to inflame his
conscience.” Id.
95. United States v. McCarty, 475 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007).
96. Id. at 45. The suspect “blurted out” a comment, telling “the officers, unprompted, that the
gun was his.” Id.
97. Shaneberger v. Jones, 615 F.3d 448, 451 (6th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original).
98. Id. at 454. The court did write that the officer’s “actions tread near the line between what
is acceptable and what violates Shaneberger’s right to counsel . . . [it is] a close question . . . .” Id.
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Are you surprised that in none of these cases did the court find interrogation
when the suspect immediately replied and gave an incriminating remark? The
motive of the officers in at least some of these cases seems clear: they were
engaging the suspect precisely because they wished to obtain incriminating
evidence they could use against him. And, in at least some of these cases, any
neutral observer could see that the actions would likely elicit a response. Why
then did the courts refuse to find interrogation? Are these statements and actions
not designed to circumvent Miranda and elicit a response? If not, what are these
statements and actions intended to achieve? Are they unlikely to get a response?
If not, why do the police do or say these things? All significant questions for
which there simply are no ready answers given by judges across the nation.
D. Statements or actions—but not questions—held to be interrogation
We all understand that under Innis and the later Supreme Court decisions,
interrogation is not necessarily synonymous with questioning. To be sure, as
noted in the numerous cases laid out above, questions can be asked directly of
the suspect—resulting in incriminating responses—yet judges may decide that
she was not interrogated. It is also true that if the police do not ask questions
but take actions or make statements aimed at the suspect those may well be found
to be interrogation. The most prominent example here is the famous so-called
Christian burial speech case, Brewer v. Williams.99 Though the analysis
ultimately was under the 6th Amendment right to counsel, as opposed to the 5th
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the holding of the Supreme
Court as to interrogation has been followed with both sorts of cases.100 There
99. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
100. Id. at 404. Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinions in Brewer and Innis, sought to
separate the two holdings:
There is language in the opinion of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in this case
suggesting that the definition of “interrogation” under Miranda is informed by this
Court’s decision in Brewer v. Williams. This suggestion is erroneous. Our decision in
Brewer rested solely on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. That
right, as we held in Massiah v. United States, prohibits law enforcement officers from
“deliberately [eliciting]” incriminating information from a defendant in the absence of
counsel after a formal charge against the defendant has been filed. Custody in such a
case is not controlling; indeed, the petitioner in Massiah was not in custody. By contrast,
the right to counsel at issue in the present case is based not on the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments, but rather on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as interpreted in the
Miranda opinion. The definitions of “interrogation” under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, if indeed the term “interrogation” is even apt in the Sixth Amendments
context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two
constitutional protections are quite distinct.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980). Justice Stewart never did explain how the
term interrogation would differ in the two contexts. In fact, numerous judges have indeed
referenced both decisions in deciding whether, under Miranda, interrogation has taken place. See,
e.g., United States v. Voice, 627 F.2d 138, 144–45 (8th Cir. 1980); March v. Sexton, No. 3:12-cv272, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86932 at *87–88 (M.D. Tenn. June 19, 2013); Steverson v. Crosby,
No. 8:03-cv-654-T-27MAP, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37049 at *43–49 (M.D. Fla. June 5, 2006);
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the defendant in a murder case had been charged and been assigned counsel.
Police officers in driving the suspect across the state for judicial proceedings
promised both the suspect and his attorney that there would be no questioning.
One principal issue in the case was whether the following statement, given to a
suspect who had delusions regarding his prominence in the religious community,
constituted interrogation. Addressing Williams as “Reverend,” one of the
detectives said:
I want to give you something to think about while we’re traveling
down the road. . . . Number one, I want you to observe the weather
conditions, it’s raining, it’s sleeting, it’s freezing, driving is very
treacherous, visibility is poor, it’s going to be dark early this evening.
They are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that
you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl’s
body is, that you yourself have only been there once, and if you get a
snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And, since we
will be going right past the area on the way into Des Moines, I felt that
we could stop and locate the body, that the parents of this little girl
should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and murdered. And I
feel we should stop and locate it on the way in, rather than waiting
until morning and trying to come back out after a snow storm, and
possibly not being able to find it at all.101
The suspect immediately made an incriminating statement. The majority of the
Court decided these remarks, directed to the suspect, constituted interrogation.
There can be no serious doubt, either, that Detective Leaming
deliberately and designedly set out to elicit information from Williams
just as surely as—and perhaps more effectively than—if he had
formally interrogated him. Detective Leaming was fully aware before
departing for Des Moines that Williams was being represented in
Davenport by Kelly and in Des Moines by McKnight. Yet he
purposely sought during Williams’ isolation from his lawyers to
obtain as much incriminating information as possible. Indeed,
Detective Leaming conceded as much when he testified at Williams’
trial:

Jones v. Smith, 244 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810–12 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Stahl v. State, 426 So.2d 909, 916
(Ala. Crim. App. 1982); People v. Ferro, 472 N.E.2d 13, 17 (N.Y. 1984) (Jason, J., dissenting);
Nelson v. State, 463 S.W.3d 123, 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015). As noted by one court, “Though
Brewer v. Williams was decided on Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the analysis of the
‘basic contours’ of the right to counsel is the same as that undertaken in Fifth Amendment cases
such as Rhode Island v. Innis.” Commonwealth v. Hunter, No. 00-1334(1-5), 2001 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 376, at *16 n.5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2001).
101. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 392–93.
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“Q. In fact, Captain, whether he was a mental patient or not,
you were trying to get all the information you could before
he got to his lawyer, weren’t you?
“A. I was sure hoping to find out where that little girl was,
yes, sir.
.....
“Q. Well, I’ll put it this way: You was [sic] hoping to get all
the information you could before Williams got back to
McKnight, weren’t you?
“A. Yes, sir.”102
The judges in the cases discussed in the previous section found no
interrogation even with actions and words directed to the suspects. With other
cases, however, we see very different results with the emphasis often looking to
the Christian burial speech decision, as reflected in the following cases:
 After the defendant invoked the right to remain silent, the officer told the
defendant he and his co-defendants would be “charge[d] . . . with murder
and that this was his ‘last chance.’”103 The court held that the experienced
officer, “clearly ‘should know’ that his statement, combined with his
actions, was ‘reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response.’”104
 The officers provided updated information three different times while the
defendant was in custody.105 The officers could not offer any explanation
why it was necessary to give the defendant such additional information on
102. Id. at 399 (alterations in original). To be sure, the Iowa Attorney General at oral argument
also appeared to concede the point.
Counsel for petitioner, in the course of oral argument in this Court, acknowledged that
the “Christian burial speech” was tantamount to interrogation:
“Q: But isn’t the point, really, Mr. Attorney General, what you indicated earlier, and that
is that the officer wanted to elicit information from Williams
“A: Yes, sir.
“Q: by whatever techniques he used, I would suppose a lawyer would consider that he
were pursuing interrogation.
“A: It is, but it was very brief.”
Id. at 399, n.6. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, was not convinced.
[N]ot every attempt to elicit information should be regarded as “tantamount to
interrogation[.]” I am not persuaded that Leaming’s observations and comments, made
as the police car traversed the snowy and slippery miles between Davenport and Des
Moines that winter afternoon, were an interrogation, direct or subtle, of Williams . . .
Williams, after all, was counseled by lawyers, and warned by the arraigning judge in
Davenport and by the police, and yet it was he who started the travel conversations and
brought up the subject of the criminal investigation . . . Persons in custody frequently
volunteer statements in response to stimuli other than interrogation . . . When there is no
interrogation, such statements should be admissible as long as they are truly voluntary.
Id. at 439–40.
103. United States v. Rosario-Cintron, 194 F. Supp. 3d 161, 166 (D.P.R. 2016).
104. Id. at 175.
105. State v. Wright, 133 A.3d 656, 667 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2016).
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the investigation. The court held that the officers’ actions constituted
interrogation.106
After the defendant was arrested, agents played him a recording of his
wiretapped statements.107 This action was found to be interrogation
because it was clear what the agents were attempting to achieve.108
The officer promised to tell the suspect what an alibi witness was
saying.109 The court found this to be interrogation, it was an attempt to
induce the defendant to speak.110

106. Id. at 668. The court explained:
It is precisely because defendant’s response is so readily understandable that we find the
officer should surely have known that his meting out of the information in the way he
did was reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response, and thus that it amounted
to an interrogation.
To be clear, like the trial judge, we see no objection to the officers’ initial statements to
defendant about why he was being detained. If defendant had at that point blurted out
that he had the cell phone, we would not hold the officers accountable for such an
unforeseeable result.
Here, however, Officer Andrek continued well beyond his initial communication
informing defendant of the reasons for his detention. The officer’s actions in continuing
to engage defendant by providing him updates on the progress of the investigation were
unnecessary, and the officer should have known they would be likely to elicit an
incriminating response, either exculpatory or inculpatory.
Id. (citations omitted).
107. United States v. Mark, 48 V.I. 769, 780 (D.V.I. 2007), aff’d 284 Fed. App’x 946 (3d Cir.
2008).
108. Id. at 976. As the court explained:
Here, Francois was under arrest at the time he made the statements in question.
Therefore, he was clearly in police custody when the statements were made.
Furthermore, after Francois was arrested but before he was given Miranda warnings, the
agents played him a tape of his allegedly incriminating conversations intercepted through
the wiretap. Accordingly, Francois was subjected to custodial interrogation before he
was advised of his rights under Miranda.
Id.
109. Shelly v. State, 262 So.3d 1, 7 (Fla. 2018).
110. Id. at 16. As the court explained:
Detective Consalo’s actions can be likened to the proverbial carrot-and-stick—using
reward and punishment to induce Shelly to acquiesce to continued interrogation. There
can be no doubt these statements induced Shelly to continue engaging with Detective
Consalo, even though he had clearly previously invoked his right to silence numerous
times.
When, as in this case, a detective persists in attempting to coax a suspect to continue the
interrogation after the suspect has unequivocally invoked his right to silence, the
detective is not asking harmless clarifying questions; he is violating the suspect’s
Miranda rights.
Id. at 16–17. For a striking recent opinion involving the police having another person approach the
defendant, see State ex rel. A.A., 222 A.3d 681 (N.J. 2020). There, the fifteen-year-old defendant
was arrested for aggravated assault. His mother was allowed to go back to the holding cell and
speak to her son in an open area. Officers allowed this because they wanted to make sure that the
minor defendant understood his right to have a parent present, as required under the New Jersey
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Officers removed the defendant from a holding cell in a courthouse where
he was detained for an unrelated offense. They then put him into a room
with no pens, paper, or recording devices.111 The officers physically
showed the defendant the rifle involved in the crime, but also told the
defendant not to say anything. Because they knew of the defendant’s
susceptibility to seeing evidence, how central the rifle was in the case, and
the effect of having the weapon reappear, the officers should have known
that their conduct was reasonably likely to result in incriminating
statements.112
 Officers arrested the defendant after he hit another car while driving
erratically.113 An officer asked the defendant what happened, and the
defendant did not answer. The officer then stated, “It smells like you have
been drinking[.]”114 This was held to be the functional equivalent of
interrogation.115
What is it about these cases which led the judges involved to find Miranda
violations? Certainly it was not any sort of prolonged, focused words or actions
which somehow compelled these defendants to incriminate themselves. Still,
there was enough police activity in each of the cases to demonstrate that an
interrogation process was at play.
law. The officers did not explain to the mother that they would be listening to the conversation
with her son and that anything her son said could be used against him. Also, they did not tell the
defendant his rights in front of his mother before the two began to speak. The New Jersey Supreme
Court ruled that the defendant’s incriminating statements were not admissible.
Under the circumstances, it was hardly a surprise that A.A. and his mother spoke about
the crime for which A.A. had been arrested. The police should have known it was
reasonably likely that A.A.’s mother would elicit incriminating responses from him.
Although we find no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police, their words and
actions set in motion A.A.’s incriminating statements to his mother. Under Innis,
therefore, A.A. was subjected to the “functional equivalent” of express questioning while
in custody. His statements, obtained without the benefit of any Miranda warnings, are
thus inadmissible.
Id. at 691 (citations omitted).
111. United States v. Lovell, 317 F. Supp. 2d 663, 665 (W.D. Va. 2004).
112. Id. at 669 (“An interrogation for Miranda purposes may be direct questioning or its
functional equivalent . . . The impact of these words or actions is to be assessed from the suspect’s
viewpoint rather than based on the officer’s intent.”).
113. Congelosi v. Miller, 611 F. Supp. 2d 274, 285 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
114. Id. at 288.
115. Id. at 293. The court explained:
[The officer conceded] at trial that when he made the comment, he was attempting to
determine whether Congelosi had been drinking. Added to that is the fact Officer Fenton
had unsuccessfully tried to get Congelosi to tell him what had happened just prior to his
making the comment about smelling alcohol on Congelosi, who apparently was
displaying the physical signs of a bellicose drunk. Under these specific circumstances, I
tend to agree with Congelosi that Officer Fenton should have known that his comment
was at least “reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”
Id.
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III. THE NEXT STEP?
What we have seen in reviewing cases from the last two decades are judicial
applications—both state and federal—of the crucial term interrogation that are
inconsistent, confusing, and often not at all faithful to the spirit of the Supreme
Court in Miranda. In virtually identical fact situations, one can find courts
which decide that interrogation has taken place, while other courts decide that
interrogation has not occurred. The reader can easily turn back to cases
involving the so-called booking exception, or cases in which officers show items
of evidence to suspects, to confirm this conclusion.
One must ask, then, is the problem with the definition the Supreme Court gave
us back in Innis, four decades ago? The definition certainly is straightforward
enough. As noted earlier, it is interrogation if “a suspect’s incriminating
response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they
should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response.”116 It is an objective standard, looking to the police officer. Justice
Stevens, in dissent, believed the standard should be objective, but looking
instead to the suspect: ”[A]ny police conduct or statements that would appear to
a reasonable person in the suspect’s position to call for a response must be
considered ‘interrogation.’”117
These two possible definitions of interrogation were offered to—and
considered by—the Court, along with the rather obvious suggestion that
interrogation occurs when the words or actions are designed to elicit an
incriminating response.118 Still, one must wonder—looking at the many judicial
applications of the Supreme Court’s actual definition—whether with a different
standard the results would truly have been any different in the bulk of cases. Let
us return to Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Innis, where he took the
majority to task for using the objective standard and finding no
interrogation. Consider, once again, the facts in Innis as stated by Justice
Marshall:
I am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how this objective
standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to the
conclusion that there was no interrogation. Innis was arrested at 4:30

116. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).
117. Id. at 311 (Steven, J., dissenting). He made a powerful argument: ”From the suspect’s
point of view, the effectiveness of the warnings depends on whether it appears that the police are
scrupulously honoring his rights.” Id.
118. Long ago, I wrote of these three approaches:
Interrogation. The current definition is a fair one, covering any actions by the police
reasonably likely to elicit a response. My suggestion is that this definition be
supplemented by including two other situations: cases in which the officers intended to
elicit an incriminating response and cases in which the suspect believed he was
undergoing interrogation.
Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line Rule” of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 145
(1993).
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a.m., handcuffed, searched, advised of his rights, and placed in the
back seat of a patrol car. Within a short time he had been twice more
advised of his rights and driven away in a four-door sedan with three
police officers. Two officers sat in the front seat and one sat beside
Innis in the back seat. Since the car traveled no more than a mile
before Innis agreed to point out the location of the murder weapon,
Officer Gleckman must have begun almost immediately to talk about
the search for the shotgun.
The Court attempts to characterize Gleckman’s statements as “no
more than a few offhand remarks” which could not reasonably have
been expected to elicit a response. If the statements had been
addressed to respondent, it would be impossible to draw such a
conclusion. The simple message of the “talking back and forth”
between Gleckman and McKenna was that they had to find the
shotgun to avert a child’s death.
One can scarcely imagine a stronger appeal to the conscience of a
suspect—any suspect—than the assertion that if the weapon is not
found an innocent person will be hurt or killed. And not just any
innocent person, but an innocent child—a little girl—a helpless,
handicapped little girl on her way to school. The notion that such an
appeal could not be expected to have any effect unless the suspect
were known to have some special interest in handicapped children
verges on the ludicrous. As a matter of fact, the appeal to a suspect to
confess for the sake of others, to “display some evidence of decency
and honor,” is a classic interrogation technique.
Gleckman’s remarks would obviously have constituted
interrogation if they had been explicitly directed to respondent, and
the result should not be different because they were nominally
addressed to McKenna. This is not a case where police officers
speaking among themselves are accidentally overheard by a suspect.
These officers were “talking back and forth” in close quarters with the
handcuffed suspect, traveling past the very place where they believed
the weapon was located. They knew respondent would hear and attend
to their conversation, and they are chargeable with knowledge of and
responsibility for the pressures to speak which they created.119
Justice Marshall was correct in that, under any of the three definitions, the
words of the officers constituted interrogation. And, yet, the majority
disagreed. That application—and the many rulings by lower courts since
1980—has not been true to the Miranda holding. Such an application does not
help to insure that the suspect’s desire to remain silent was—as stated by the
Chief Justice in Miranda—”scrupulously honored,” or that no one in custody is

119. Innis, 446 U.S. at 305–07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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questioned without being given a statement of his constitutional rights.120 No,
regardless of the three approaches that could be used, I believe it is fair to
conclude that the results in the cases discussed above would not differ greatly
and that defendants’ wishes to remain silent or have a lawyer would not have
been followed in many of these prosecutions.121 What, then, is to be done to
reinvigorate this aspect of Miranda?

120. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
121. For this writer, perhaps the most troubling cases are those laid out earlier in which the
police show (or tell about) the evidence against the defendant and she then makes an incriminating
statement. They are troubling precisely because one might well conclude that this demonstration
or comment by the police is truly designed to get an incriminating statement and would be
reasonably likely to do so. Yet, as we have seen, courts are split as to whether such actions
constitute interrogation. The United States Supreme Court, however, has been silent on this
point. The closest the Court got to it was more than thirty years ago in a case from Florida
potentially raising the issue. The Court, however, denied certiorari. Only Justice White appeared
bothered by the judicial responses to these police actions and remarks. He dissented from the denial
of certiorari:
[P]etitioner, once in custody, was given Miranda warnings and immediately invoked his
right to remain silent. The police did not try to question him, but instead took him to a
room where he was shown a videotape of the robbery, which also included footage of the
shooting of the attendant. While viewing the videotape, petitioner made several
incriminating statements to an officer . . . Petitioner argued that being confronted with
evidence of this nature is the “functional equivalent” of express questioning, which is
impermissible once a person in custody has invoked his right to remain silent, but the
Florida Court of Appeal disagreed.
We have stated that “interrogation” under Miranda does include conditions that are its
“functional equivalent,” that is, “any words or actions on the part of the police (other than
those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion
of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the
intent of the police.” We also have observed that a “psychological ploy” of any
significance would also be treated as the “functional equivalent” of interrogation.
Whether police may confront a suspect with evidence against him, outside the range of
normal arrest and charging procedures, without engaging in the “functional equivalent”
of interrogation is a substantial question in light of Innis. In addition, the federal and
state courts disagree over the issue. Some courts, for example, have found an
interrogation to have occurred when the police, in booking a suspect, merely advised him
of the charges and then described the evidence against him in some detail . . . On the
other side of the issue, moreover, some courts have treated more adventurous police
practices, which are in no sense any part of the formal arrest or charging procedures, as
the “functional equivalent” of interrogation . . . I would grant certiorari to consider the
construction of Innis rendered by the court below and to resolve the significant
disagreement on this general issue among the state and federal courts, which has led those
courts both to handicap the police in pursuing some apparently legitimate lawenforcement practices and to approve the use of other ploys that have nothing to do with
the usual and accepted procedures for arresting and charging a suspect.
Lewis v. Florida, 486 U.S. 1036, 1037–38 (1988) (citations omitted). A close second as to troubling
actions could be found in the many cases in which a suspect makes an incriminating statement after
hearing one officer tell another officer of concerns about the suspect, the evidence, or safety issues.
See supra note 13.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Is there a better way? I suggest that there is. The guiding principle should
simply be that any words or actions which actually lead to incriminating
statements qualify as interrogation. Basically, I am promoting the standard butfor, actual cause test from the first year Criminal Law class. This is, of course,
considerably broader than what the Supreme Court discussed in Innis and
Muniz. It would mean that in almost all the cases reviewed in this article,
interrogations should have been found. This is necessary because the
applications in the case law in favor of the government go well beyond what
could properly be seen as police actions not designed or likely to elicit an
incriminating response.
There may be situations in which a defendant shouts out something damaging
in response to a truly neutral sort of question or action. In that case there should
certainly be some relief for the government. Let us suppose we have our
defendant from the start of this article, who blurts out an incriminating comment
in response to the question of whether she wanted regular or decaf coffee. There
we can properly conclude that the government’s comment or action was
genuinely not designed or likely to elicit an incriminating response. If the
prosecution could show this by clear and convincing evidence—and the burden
would be on the prosecution—no interrogation would be found. That, though,
is a far distance from what we see today with courts inappropriately stretching
the interrogation doctrine to admit incriminating statements that—with little
doubt—result from less than neutral concern about caffeine preferences.
If my proposed solution is not palatable, let us consider the possibility that the
Supreme Court continue to use its Innis definition of interrogation, but send the
message (through some decided cases) that judges are to be realistic in applying
the term. That is, when we see an officer showing a video to a suspect, asking
how all is going with that person, or loudly expressing concern over the safety
of a victim, we should require the judge to ask the obvious question: What was
it that this officer was really doing with these words or actions? And, in many
of these cases we know the answer to that question. The officer was trying to
get incriminating information and knew such an approach might well be
effective. That would and should be seen as interrogation necessitating
Miranda warnings.
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